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ABSTRACT A modern vehicle is a complex system of sensors, electronic control units, and actuators
connected through different types of intra-vehicle networks to control and monitor the state of the vehicle.
In addition, modern vehicles are becoming increasingly connected to the outside world through V2X
technologies. However, these provide new attack surfaces that increase the cybersecurity risk to modern
vehicles. To this end, there are two distinct and key challenges that need to be addressed to ensure safety
and consumer trust. While modern vehicles must be equipped with the best countermeasures against
cybersecurity threats, a reliable mechanism shall be also in place to detect the potential intrusions of the
system while in operation, which is termed as intrusion detection. This paper provides a structured and
comprehensive review of the state of the art of the intra-vehicle intrusion detection systems (IDSs) for
passenger vehicles. We first provide an overview of intra-vehicle networks before reviewing contemporary
research in intra-vehicle IDSs. The approach employed is to categorize the reviewed works based on their
detection technique and to examine the used feature and feature selection methods, evaluation dataset, attack
type, performance metrics, and benchmark models. This paper also presents outstanding research challenges
and gaps in intra-vehicle IDS research.
INDEX TERMS CAN bus, intra-vehicle network, intrusion detection, intrusion detection systems (IDSs).
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid adoption of various modern technologies by car
manufacturers in the last decade has revolutionized the
shape and functions of modern vehicles (i.e., cars). This
includes advanced functions such as automation features and
interconnectivity with the external world (e.g., Vehicle to
Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) commu-
nications) to improve safety and enable cooperation between
vehicles.
A typical modern vehicle integrates a set of networked
components including sensors, actuators, Electronic Control
Units (ECUs), and communication devices [1]. Sensors, for
example, can help the vehicle perceives its surrounding envi-
ronment and uses that perception to automate various aspects
of driving functions using several ECUs [2]. Each ECU has
usually a specific function (e.g., steering angle control) and
ECUs are grouped based on their functions into subnet-
works (e.g., powertrain, infotainment, etc.). The subnetworks
are interconnected through several gateways, structuring the
intra-vehicle network of the vehicle. Typically, the ECUs
communicate via the Controller Area Network (CAN), a de-
facto network protocol for in-vehicle communication.
The low cost, relatively high reliability, and fault toler-
ance properties of CAN motivate its use as a standard for
intra-vehicle networking. However, it has been recognized
that CAN is vulnerable to cyberattacks, meaning that many
modern vehicles can be exposed to new threats owing to the
connectivity to external networks. Two of the main reasons
of such vulnerability lie in the fact that the CAN protocol
lacks message authentication and the broadcast transmis-
sion [2]. An intruder can send messages through the CAN
once he/she gain access to it, since the CAN protocol does not
provide an authentication mechanism to verify the origin of
the messages. Checkoway et al. [3] have shown that remote
exploitation of a vehicle is possible via a broad range of attack
vectors (such as CD players, bluetooth, and cellular), which
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TABLE 1. A Comparison of This Survey With Existing Survey Articles.
can lead to remote vehicle control [4]. This makes vehicular
security a major concern in the automotive industry, as well
causing alarm to the public.
Protecting vehicles against cyberattacks is a challenging
task since historically vehicles have been designed without
comprehensive security requirements in mind, having relied
on the assumption that vehicles operate independently with
no communication capabilities. In this respect, conventional
proactive security countermeasures (such as encryption algo-
rithms, access control and the like) might not be applicable
to modern vehicles due to the high connectivity (giving a
large attack surface), time-sensitivity, resource constraints,
and complexity of modern vehicles [5], [6]. Recently, a con-
siderable attention has been paid to reactive systems, such
as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), as complementary
solutions to proactive security countermeasures, since they
can detect potential cyberattacks in intra-vehicle networks as
well as misbehaviors in connected vehicular networks [7].
Although there is an abundance research in the literature
discussing vehicles cybersecurity (see [8], [9]), to the authors’
best knowledge, a systematic review of the state-of-the-art of
intra-vehicle IDS can be a valuable contribution to provide
a fresh and critical review of the most recent studies on
this particular topic. This we believe will complement the
existing broad surveys such as that in [1], [10], and [11],
that mainly focus on the security of cyber-physical sys-
tems with broad reference to IDS. Two other related articles
were published by Studnia et al. [8] and Liu et al. [12] that
mainly survey security threats and protection mechanisms in
embedded automotive networks and briefly mentioned IDSs.
Also, van der Heijden et al. [13] and Sakiz and Sen [14]
have studied attacks and detection mechanisms in intelligent
transportation systems, concentrating on vehicular ad-hoc
networks rather than on intrusion detection in intra-vehicle
networks. Zarpelão et al. [15] presented a survey about IDSs
for Internet of Thing (IoT), identifying leading trends, open
issues, and future research possibilities. Zarpelão et al classi-
fied the IDSs proposed in the literature according to detection
method, IDS placement strategy, security threat and valida-
tion strategy.
Unlike the aforementioned surveys, this paper provides
a thorough, comprehensive, and systematic review of state-
of-the-art IDSs for intra-vehicle networks. To help position
the contributions of this paper with respect to the existing
published work, Table 1 shows a comparison between this
survey and relevant survey articles.
In this paper, we review contemporary research of intra-
vehicle IDSs and discuss in detail their current state focusing
on the used detection technique, features and feature selection
method, evaluation data, performance metrics, and bench-
mark models, and the targeted attack types. We also discuss
the current issues and challenges of intra-vehicle IDSs. The
contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) Providing an overview of intra-vehicle networks, dis-
cussing merits and shortcomings of prevalently used
intra-vehicle networks.
2) Reviewing and categorizing contemporary research of
intra-vehicle IDSs (42 works) based on their detection
technique, and examining each work based on the used
features and feature selection method, evaluation data,
performance metrics and benchmark models, and tar-
geted attack types.
3) Providing a comprehensive summary of contemporary
research in intra-vehicle IDSs (Tables 5–7).
4) Discussing and identifying challenges and current gaps
in the landscape of intra-vehicle IDSs research, sup-
ported by statistical analysis of existing work.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section II gives an overview of intra-vehicle networks.
Section III reviews recent researches into intra-vehicle IDS
and categorizes them into two main categories: flow-based
IDSs and payload-based IDSs and then further catego-
rizes them based on the detection technique employed.
It then discusses most commonly used/studied features and
feature selection methods, datasets, attack types, perfor-
mance metrics and benchmark models in intra-vehicle IDSs
research. Section IV provides a discussion and identifies
research gaps and challenges before Section V concludes this
paper.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF INTRA-VEHICLE NETWORKS
Today’s vehicle is a formidable sensor platform transmit-
ting around 2500 signals internally with an approximately
70 ECUs connected via an intra-vehicle network [4], [16].
The intra-vehicle network facilitates data sharing among sen-
sors, ECUs, and actuators, enabling the operation of the
vehicle. There are five widely used intra-vehicle networks
in the modern intra-vehicle communication systems: Local
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TABLE 2. Selected Comparisons of Intra-vehicle Networks [16].
Interconnection Network (LIN), CAN, FlexRay, Ethernet,
and Media Oriented Systems Transport (MOST). Each has
its own advantages and limitations. Table 2 provides a com-
parison of intra-vehicle networks.
LIN provides a low communication speed suitable for
applications that do not require stringent time performance
such as battery monitoring, window lifter control, etc..
Although LIN has low cost and security threat, it has a low
fault-tolerant capability. On the other hand, FlexRay, Ether-
net, and MOST have a higher bandwidth than LIN. However,
they have higher relative system cost and security threat com-
pared to LIN. The high bandwidth and efficiency of FlexRay,
Ethernet, and MOST make them suitable for stringent time
performance and bandwidth demanding applications. For
example, FlexRay is used in steering angle sensor, safety
radar, throttle control, etc., whereas Ethernet and MOST are
typically used in ECU flash interface and infotainment sys-
tem, respectively [16]. Among intra-vehicle networks, CAN
is the most popular due to its relatively low cost, mature
full-scale tool chains (e.g., data dictionary design, production
code generation, network simulation, etc.), acceptable perfor-
mance in noise-resistance, and fault tolerance. However CAN
is vulnerable to security threats. CAN is commonly used in
powertrain and upper body electronics [16].
Typically, a CAN comes with a bus topology that supports
a baud rate higher than 125 Kbit/s and is characterized by
two 120 terminal resistances at the end of the transmission
cable. CAN protocol does not require any global synchro-
nization or timing to regulate the communication since nodes
connected to the CAN bus synchronize their timing with the
sender when receiving messages. Each node connected to the
CAN has the right to access the bus when a transmission
is ready and the bus is idle. The CAN bus is a broadcast
domain in which all nodes connected to the CAN bus receive
the transmitted message. The reception filter of each node
decides which message to select using the ID of the message.
When multiple nodes attempt to transmit messages at the
same time, they compete for access to the bus through a non-
destructible Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision
Avoidance (CSMA/CA) and Arbitration on Message Prior-
ity (AMP) where the message with the lower ID wins the
arbitration process [16]; the message with the lower ID has
the higher priority. Figure 1 shows the structure of a standard
CAN frame.
As can be seen in Figure 1, a CAN frame consists of seven
fields as follows:
• Start of Frame: a single dominant bit that informs a start
of transmission to all nodes.
• Arbitration Field: it consists of two main parts; the iden-
tifier field that represents the ID of the message/frame
and is used during the arbitration process; and the
Remote Transmission Request (RTR) which is deter-
mined according to the kind of the CAN frame.
• Control Field: it has two reserved bits and four Data
Length Code (DLC).
• Data Field: holds the actual data transferred to other
nodes.
• CRC Field: it guarantees the validity of the message. All
other nodes that receive the message verify the message
using this code.
• ACK Field: it consists of two bits: ACK part and delim-
iter part. A node that receives a valid message replaces
the ACK part, which is a recessive bit (i.e., logical 1),
with a dominant bit (i.e., logical 0).
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FIGURE 1. Structure of CAN Frame.
• End of Frame: a flag that consists of seven recessive bits
and indicates the end of the frame.
III. IDSS FOR INTRA-VEHICLE NETWORKS
Several security countermeasures have been developed to
defend systems against cyberattacks. Proactive countermea-
sures, such as encryption algorithms and access control, aim
to prevent attackers from gaining access to the systems.
Although proactive countermeasures can protect systems
from external cyberattacks, they have limited capability in
front of internal attacks. On the other hand, reactive counter-
measures (e.g., IDSs) identify cyberattacks once they occur.
Conventionally, IDSs are categorized based on their detection
technique into: misuse/knowledge and behavior/anomaly -
based IDSs [11].
A knowledge-based IDS compares observed events with
patterns (i.e., signatures) of known attacks. The IDS reports
an intrusion when it finds a match between the observed
events and the known attacks’ patterns. Generally speak-
ing, knowledge-based IDSs have low false positive rate;
as they react only to previously known attacks. However,
such approaches have limited capabilities in detecting novel
attacks (e.g., zero-day attack). In addition, the signatures
database must stay current, which is a challenging task espe-
cially with the constant growth in the number of novel attacks.
Moreover, storing large signature database and performing
pattern matching on it is a demanding process in terms of
memory, CPU time, and power [17]. Monther Aldwairi and
Jarrah [17] presented a parallel IDS approach to accelerate the
pattern matching operation through parallelizing a matching
algorithm on a multi-core CPU.
An anomaly-based IDS identifies normal system behavior
and considers significant deviations from the normal behavior
as intrusions. Such an approach does not need generating
a signature for each attack, making it capable of detecting
novel attacks. However, such an approach has a relatively
high false positive rate. In addition, modeling of normal
system’s behavior requires attacks-free data, which are not
always available in real-world. Generally speaking, anomaly-
based IDSs require less memory compared to signature-based
IDSs since anomaly-based IDSs do not store attacks’ signa-
tures [1].
A. CATEGORIES OF INTRA-VEHICLE IDSS
We categorize intra-vehicle IDSs into: flow-based, payload-
based, and hybrid IDSs. A flow-based IDSmonitors the inter-
nal network of a vehicle, typically the CAN bus, and extracts
distinct features (e.g., message frequency and interval) from
FIGURE 2. Categories of Intra-vehicle IDSs.
the messages transmitted on the network. It then uses the
extracted features to identify intrusions or abnormal behav-
iors without inspecting the payload/content of the messages.
On the other hand, a payload-based IDS examines the payload
of the messages to identify intrusions. A hybrid IDS is a com-
bination of the former two categories. We further categorize
the main categories based on their detection technique into
sub-categories as in Figure 2. In the following subsections,
we review contemporary researches that belong to each sub-
category. Despite our effort, this paper might not cover all
work reported in the literature of intra-vehicle IDSs.
1) FLOW-BASED IDSS
(I) Rule-based IDSs: Vuong et al. [18] developed a deci-
sion tree-based detection model for cyberattacks. The
detection model is built using eight on-board physi-
cal and cyber features. Experimental evaluation of the
proposedmodel, against four types of attack on a small-
scale robotic vehicle, revealed that considering physi-
cal features noticeably improves the detection accuracy
for two of the four types and reduces the detection
latency of all types of attack. However, the proposed
system has a high detection latency of about 1sec.
Fu et al. [19] proposed an FPGA-based IDS based
on novel data model named Link-NFA. The proposed
system prototype was applied in vehicular environment
and achieved a high real-time performance, a through-
put of more than 39 Gbps, which is about 15% higher
than state-of-the-art techniques. The total power con-
sumption of the prototype is about 7.5W and the pro-
cessing latency is about 4 µs, which is about one
sixtieth part of the popular software IDSs.
However, the proposed model is specified for FPGA,
making it unlikely to be implemented in other hardware
platforms such as GPU and CPU. In addition, the num-
ber of NFAs in Link-NFA is related to RegEx, which
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may grow rapidly in some extreme cases. Moreover,
the implemented rule-set is not an Internet of Vehicle
(IoV) rule-set, which makes the applicability of the
proposed system to vehicular system questionable.
(II) Time and Frequency Analysis -based IDSs: Hoppe
et al. [20] discussed the main requirements of an auto-
motive application of intrusion detection approaches
and how they differ from the requirements of con-
ventional computer networks applications. With ref-
erence to a practically demonstrated attack on an
automotive network, the authors presented a proto-
typically anomaly-based IDS. The presented system
tracks all CAN messages having a target message
type (e.g., 0x395) and evaluates two different char-
acteristics; the current frequency of these messages
and the semantical meaning of the previous messages.
In addition, the authors discussed the reaction to attacks
once detected. The authors proposed to utilise mul-
timedia devices (e.g., visual display, acoustic, haptic)
of a vehicle and to use them as computer-human-
interfaces to adaptively report security incidents to
the driver/occupants of the vehicle while considering
the conditions of the surrounding environment (e.g.,
high noise). The authors argued that different reactive
measures should be used to report security incidents
depending on driving conditions. For instance, visual
display/dashboardmight be used to report security inci-
dents when there is a high noise.
Ling and Feng [21] presented an algorithm for intrusion
detection in CAN. The concept is based on combining
the IDs of messages transmitted on the CAN bus with
their interruptible occurrence frequency. For a given
input ID, the algorithm counts the number of contin-
uous messages that belong to the given message type
(i.e., ID). If the count of messages in the interrupt-
ible sequence is greater than a predefined threshold,
the algorithm raises an alarm of a possible attack.
Although its simplicity, the proposed algorithm has
limited capability in detecting attacks that manipulate
the content of messages while maintaining their fre-
quency.
Taylor et al. [22] proposed and compared the per-
formance of a frequency-based detector with One-
Class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM). Experimen-
tal results on real data of a Ford Explorer over a range
of packet/message insertion and deletion showed that
the frequency-based can detect anomalies with an Area
Under Curve (AUC) between 0.8720 and 1.0000 over a
time window of 1sec. On the other hand, the OCSVM
can detect anomalies with an AUC between 0.9874 and
0.9893 over a timewindow of 0.4sec. However, the pro-
posed approach is suitable only for periodic messages.
Song et al. [23] proposed a lightweight IDS based on
a statistical analysis of time intervals of CAN mes-
sages. The authors concluded that the analysis of the
time interval of CAN messages is a meaningful feature
to detect packet/message injection attack. The main
concept is to analyze traffic anomalies based on mes-
sage frequency. Under normal operation conditions,
messages generated by ECUs have their own regular
frequency or interval. When a vehicle under message
injection attack, these frequencies or intervals are unex-
pectedly changed. Typically, the frequency ofmessages
under injection attack increases by 20–100 times higher
than the normal case. Experimental results on CAN
messages of a real anonymized vehicle showed that
the proposed method is very effective and efficient in
detecting message injection attack without any false
alarms.
Young et al. [24] introduced a road map towards a
security solution for intra-vehicle networks. The pro-
posed solution can detect anomalies, identify failed
states of the network, and adaptively respond in real-
time to maintain a fail-operational system. The authors
argued that observingmessage sequences is essential to
detect semantic attacks that span multiple state transi-
tion. Based on the observation that control messages
are high priority, periodic and predictable messages,
the proposed IDS partitions incoming messages into
control and non-control messages. It then uses an algo-
rithm to examine the control messages exploiting the
high predictability of suchmessages and a kernel-based
Machine Learning (ML) algorithm to detect sequential
anomalies. However, generally speaking, kernel-based
models have a substantial time complexity, deterio-
rating their efficiency for intrusion detection tasks in
vehicular systems. In addition, such an approach is
not applicable to aperiodic messages (e.g., even-driven
messages), as the high variability of such messages
might lead to a high number of false positives.
Cho and Shin [25] built an effective IDS called Clock-
based Intrusion Detection System (CIDS), which can
detect various types of attack including the masquer-
ade attack. Since the CAN protocol does not provide
the identity of the transmitter in the CAN message,
the authors fingerprinted ECUs with other ‘‘leaked’’
information. The authors exploited message periodic-
ity to extract and estimate transmitters’ clock skews,
which can be used to fingerprint the transmitter ECUs.
The total amount of offset (the accumulated clock off-
set) is obtained by summing up the absolute values
of the average clock offsets. By definition, the slope
of the accumulated clock offset would thus represent
the clock skew, which is constant. This enables the
proposed CIDS to estimate the clock skew from arrival
timestamps and thus fingerprint the message transmit-
ter for intrusion detection.
For a given message ID, CIDS derives the accumulated
clock offset inherent in the arrival timestamps. Since
the clock skew is constant, the accumulated clock offset
is linear in time, and hence CIDS describes it as a lin-
ear regression model. A linear parameter identification
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problem is thus formulated and solved by Least Square
algorithm.
The authors used a CAN prototype and a Honda accord
for experiments. Approximately, 2.25 million mes-
sages of 30 minutes of driving were collected and the
CIDS was tested against three types of attacks: sus-
pension (i.e., deletion), fabrication (i.e., injection), and
masquerade attacks. Experimental results have shown
that the CIDS not only can detect different types of
attacks with high accuracy but also can identify the ori-
gin of the attack. The proposed system achieved a True
Positive Rate (TPR) of 100% and False Positive Rate
(FPR) of 0.055%. However, the CIDS can pin-out the
origin of the attack only for periodicmessages. It would
be difficult to fingerprint ECUs that send aperiodic
messages. The case when multiple ECUs are compro-
mised and participating in a masquerade attack is not
considered. In this case, the CIDS might fail in identi-
fying the origin of the attack. In addition, the authors
assumed that the clock skew is inimitable. However,
this assumption was refuted by Choi et al. [2].
Mabrouka Gmiden and Trabelsi [26] proposed an
IDS based on time interval analysis of periodic mes-
sages. The proposed system considers messages that
do not conform to a learned time periodicity model
as attacks or anomalies. However, the authors did not
provide any performance evaluation of the proposed
system and the proposed model is suitable for detect-
ing anomalies in periodic messages only, limiting it’s
applicability to anomalies in aperiodic messages.
Lee et al. [27] proposed an IDS called Offset Ratio
and Time Interval based Intrusion Detection System
(OTIDS) based on the analysis of the offset ratio and
the time interval between remote frame requests and
responses in the CAN. The concept is based on the
observation that the offset and time interval of a win-
dow, which is defined as the messages between a
remote frame request and it’s response, of a particular
identifier in attack-free state are different compared to
when under-attack. Based on this property, intrusions
can be detected by monitoring response performance
based on the offset ratio and time interval of windows
and comparing it to response performance of attack-
free state. The OTIDS considers a response to remote
frame of an identifier that have an offset ratio or time
interval beyond a threshold as an indication of intru-
sion. The authors argued that the OTIDS is capa-
ble of detecting Denial of Service (DoS), Fuzzy, and
impersonation attacks in CAN. However, the impact
of inserting remote frame on the performance of the
vehicle was not studied. This is of interest as inserting
remote frames with a high priority might delay trans-
mitting of messages with a lower priority, which might
disturb the normal functions of the vehicle. In addi-
tion, the detection accuracy and other performance
metrics of the proposed system were not presented.
Thankfully, the authors made the evaluation dataset
available online, facilitating further experiments and
research.
Avatefipour [28] proposed aML-basedmodel that links
CAN packets to their sources by learning specific arti-
facts derived from the physical signal attributes of the
received packets. Material and design imperfections in
the physical channel and digital device, which are the
main contributing factors behind the device-channel
specific unique artifacts, were leveraged to link the
received electrical signal to the transmitter. A fea-
ture vector, which consists of 11 time and frequency
domain statistical signal attributes including higher-
order moments, spectral flatness measure, minimum,
maximum, and irregularity K, was made up of both
time and frequency domain physical attributes and then
employed to train a neural network-based classifier.
Performance of the proposed fingerprinting method
was evaluated by using a dataset collected from 16 dif-
ferent channels and four identical ECUs transmitting
same message. Experimental results indicated that the
proposed model can achieve correct detection rates
of 95.2% and 98.3% for channel and ECU classifica-
tion, respectively.
(III) Computational Intelligence and Information Theory -
based IDSs: Müter and Asaj [29] proposed an infor-
mation theoretical approach based on entropy to
detect three types of attack, namely Message Injec-
tion (MI), DoS and Plausibility of Interrelated Events.
The authors observed that traffic in automotive net-
works is more restricted than conventional computer
networks since every message and its content is spec-
ified before transmitting it. This means the entropy
(i.e., uncertainty) of the data in the normal network
operation is almost fixed and relatively low compared
to conventional computer networks. Thus, intrusions
that change the entropy of the data might easily be
detected by observing the entropy value. For exam-
ple, MI attack will reduce the entropy value since the
number of specific messages will increase. This change
in entropy can thus be detected by the IDS and used
as an indicator of attacks. The main advantage of the
proposed approach is that it requires only records of in-
vehicle network traffic as input. However, the proposed
approach has limited capability in detecting small-scale
attacks which could be part of the normal behavior. The
evaluation of the proposed approach has shown that it
can successfully detect attacks that deviate from the
normal network behavior.
Marchetti et al. [30] introduced an entropy-based IDS
and evaluated its effectiveness applied to networks
included in modern vehicles. The use of entropy
as a mean to describe the normal behavior of an
information source relies on the following underlying
assumptions: (1) the entropy of messages generated
by the information source exhibits stable statistical
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characteristics; (2) relevant anomalies introduce sig-
nificant deviations in the statistical characteristics of
the entropy. Marchetti et al. observed that the entropy
values are stable and their distributions are similar to
the normal distribution. Since entropy values appear
to be rather stable over time and distributed accord-
ing to a normal distribution, the authors proposed an
anomaly detection algorithm based on the assumption
that entropy values that are too distant from the aver-
age entropy are unlikely, and should be considered as
anomalies.
An anomaly is reported if the entropy value is not
included in an acceptable parametrized range that
defines the sensitivity of the algorithm with respect
to deviations from the expected mean. Attacks to
in-vehicle networks were simulated by injecting dif-
ferent classes of forged CAN messages in traces cap-
tured from a modern licensed vehicle. Experimental
results showed that if entropy-based anomaly detection
is applied to all CAN messages, it is only possible to
detect attacks that comprise a high volume of forged
CAN messages. On the other hand, attacks character-
ized by the injection of few forged CAN messages
can be detected only by applying several indepen-
dent instances of the entropy based anomaly detec-
tor (one for each class of CAN messages). The main
advantage of this approach is the complete indepen-
dence with respect to the content of CAN messages,
hence it can be applied immediately to the CAN bus
of any vehicle without the need of proprietary infor-
mation that is necessary to interpret the semantic of
CAN messages. However, this approach requires sev-
eral anomaly detectors (one for each ID) to be executed
in parallel. Moreover, this approach proves to be inef-
fective for a small subset of IDs whose entropy exhibits
large variations even in normal conditions.
Levi et al. [6] proposed a new temporal based detection
technique using Hidden Markov Model (HMM) and
regression model for vehicle fleet. Important data are
collected and then tested against the HMM trained on
vehicles’ normal behavior. A regression model is built
based on temporal features, which is then used to pre-
dict an estimated log-likelihood and compare the result
with the actual log-likelihood. Experimental results
showed that the proposed model has a superior perfor-
mance, AUC of 0.96, of detecting real-life anomalies.
However, the authors did not evaluate the performance
of the proposed model on a real dataset. In addition,
the authors did not show the detection latency and the
training time of the proposed model.
Rieke et al. [31] proposed an intrusion detection model
based on Petri nets. In the first stage of the proposed
model, the discovery stage, a model representing the
normal behavior of the vehicle is derived offline where
the Alpha algorithm is used to derive a Petri net from
traces recorded from the CAN bus. In the second stage,
FIGURE 3. Data flow in CAID [32].
the conformance checking stage, the model is uti-
lized to identify anomalies. Experimental results have
shown that the proposed model can achieve a high
throughput with a low complexity. However, impor-
tant performance measures (e.g., detection rate) were
not presented in this work. In addition, evaluating the
performance of the proposed method against other
cyberattacks than message injection would be of great
value.
Wasicek et al. [32] presented a behavior-based
Context-Aware Intrusion Detection (CAID) framework
that recognizes physical manipulations of the sys-
tem using cyber means. CAID refines existing IDS
approaches by integrating a physical model of the
system to establish a context-awareness in the IDS.
It integrates three modules: monitors, detectors, and
reporters, as in Figure 3. Themonitors collect telemetry
data by sending queries via the chip/reply protocol
and extract features from data points within a time
window from a set of ECUs of the vehicle. It then
uses the extracted features to build a reference model,
which represents the typical behavior of the monitored
control system, using bottleneck Artificial Neural Net-
work (ANN).
During operation, CAID checks the data against the
reference model by performing a plausibility check
using the reference model. If the actual behavior and
the reference behavior differ, it generates an event that
indicates a potential intrusion. The detector module
aggregates the events generated form the monitor mod-
ules with other relevant information in the detector
module. This implements the second level of context.
Once an intrusion is detected by the detector module,
reporters perform the actual reporting of the event to a
party (e.g., the driver). Experiments using a test vehicle
have shown that CAID is able to recognize the chip tun-
ing with a very high probability. However, the data used
in the experiments were collected in a well-defined
environment on urban and highway roads, which might
not the case in real-world where different driving con-
ditions and environments are expected. For instance,
the impact of road conditions was not presented in this
work.
Choi et al. [2] proposed a novel automotive IDS
called VoltageIDS, which examines distinct character-
istics of the electrical CAN signal corresponding to
CAN messages in order to identify the sender of the
messages. Conceptually, if two different ECUs send
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the same message, there would be an inconsistency
between the two signals in the physical layer due to the
different cables lengths and wiring resistances, which
increase with the wire length.
VoltageIDS is composed of three phases: i) signal mea-
surement and preprocessing, ii) feature extraction, and
iii) intrusion detection. In the first phase, the Volt-
ageIDS pre-processes the electrical signal of CAN
messages to obtain the dominant state, positive and
negative-slope portions of the signals, where the signal
state changes from recessive to dominant state and
vice-versa, which contain unique properties generated
by several passive (e.g., resistance) and active (e.g.,
capacitor) transmitter components.
In the feature extraction phase, the VoltageIDS extracts
all possible features found to be outstanding on node
identification for preprocessed signals (i.e., domi-
nant, positive-slope, and negative-slope). It considers
20 time and frequency features for each signal, result-
ing in 60 features for each CAN message. This is
followed by a feature selection method, the Sequential
Forward Selection (SFS), that selects most important
features out of the 60 features.
The intrusion detection phase can be divided according
to the attack type. For masquerade attack detection,
the VoltageIDS can detect a masquerade attack by
building a supervised multi-class classifier where the
number of classes is equal to the number of ECUs in the
network. The multi-class classifier (i.e., Support Vector
Machine (SVM) or Bagged Decision Tree (BDT)) is
trained on an attack-free dataset of labeled data where
the CAN ID is the target class. To classify a new CAN
message, the VoltageIDS extracts 60 features or the
most important features from the message signal and
the multi-class classifier is then used to predict the
CAN ID of the message. If the prediction is different
from the actual CAN ID, VoltageIDS reports an intru-
sion. To detect buss-off attack, the VoltageIDS adopts a
simple thresholding approach based on the assumption
that the bus-off attack is an unknown signal that devi-
ates from the normal behavior. The VoltageIDS builds
anOCSVMclassifier on unlabeled normal signals from
legitimate ECUs and considers the signals below the
normal behavior threshold as intrusions. The authors
extended the VoltageIDS to learn incrementally and
makes it robust against temperature changes.
Experimental results on CAN prototype and vehicles,
Hyundai Sonata 2010 and Kia Soul 2014, have shown
that the VoltageIDS can detect the masquerade attack
with a high accuracy. The experimental results also
have shown that the VoltageIDS is capable of detect-
ing the bus-off attack with a FPR of 0%. However,
signal preprocessing and feature extraction of CAN
messages might be time consuming processes, which
might increase the time required to detect possible
intrusions, hindering the use of VoltageIDS in real-
world. Unfortunately, the training and testing time of
the proposed method were not provided.
(IV) Others/Hybrid IDSs: Boudguiga et al. [33] proposed
a simple IDS for CAN where each ECU peri-
odically registers with other ECUs by sending a
Domain_Activation Frame. The registered ECU mon-
itors the CAN bus for messages (i.e., messages that
have identifiers associated with the ECU) that have
been sent on its behalf by a malicious entity. Once a
forge message is detected, the ECU erases the forged
message by sending an error frame. It then notifies the
other ECUs about the detected intrusion by sending a
Domain_Violation Frame. However, the authors did not
present experiments to show the effectiveness of the
proposed IDS. In addition, the proposed method needs
keymanagement capability, whichmight demotivate its
use in real-world.
Marchetti and Stabili [34] proposed an anomaly-
based IDS based on the analysis of messages flow
sequences on the CAN bus. A normal behavior model
is built based on recurring patterns observed within
the sequence of message identifiers. The training phase
of the proposed model includes analyzing traces of
real CAN bus traffic of an unmodified licensed vehicle
in normal operation conditions (i.e., attack-free con-
ditions). The output of the training phase is a transi-
tion matrix that identifies all legit transitions between
the messages identifiers of two consecutive messages.
A CAN message that does not conform with the tran-
sition matrix is identified as an attack. Experimental
evaluations based on real CAN traces demonstrated a
high performance represented by a high detection and
a low FPR. However, the proposed system has a low
detection rate, between 20% and 40%, for the replay
attack.
2) PAYLOAD-BASED IDSS
(I) Rule-based IDSs: Bezemskij et al. [35] developed a
detection mechanism that monitors real-time cyber and
physical features from different on-board sources (e.g.,
sensors, networks, and processing) of a robot vehicle.
In the learning phase, the vehicle learns the normal
value range of the features (i.e., normal behavior pro-
file). The normal behavior profile is based on signa-
ture characteristics of each data source. If an observed
value of a feature is out of its normal range, the detec-
tion mechanism reports an attack. The tolerance of
the proposed mechanism towards false positives and
false negatives is controlled by a sensitivity index and
individual weights for features are used to fine tune
their importance in detecting anomalies, resulting in
an improved detection accuracy. The proposed mech-
anism was evaluated on three types of attack: compass
manipulation, MI and rouge node attack. The proposed
method achieved an AUC of 1, 1, and 0.875 for the
three attacks, respectively. However, the performance
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of the proposed mechanism on other attacks was not
presented. In addition, the proposed mechanism was
evaluated on a robot vehicle with a limited mobility
capability, which might not be a good representative
of the real-world where vehicles are more capable and
various driving conditions exist.
Abbott-McCune and Shay [36] presented an IDS that
monitors the CAN bus and finds anomaly by matching
the Start Of Frame (SOF) field of messages to the ones
programmed in the ECU connected to the CAN bus.
If there is a match and the ECU is not transmitting,
the ECU identifies a replay attack and would send an
alert to the detector alerting that a replay attack has
taken place. An invalid message is the message that has
an arbitration identifier not associated with the ECUs
on the CAN bus segment. Each logical segment would
require a device, which could be implemented on the
gateway, to monitor all traffic and compare messages’
identifiers to the preprogrammed valid identifiers from
the manufacturer. Messages with identifiers that are
not part of the logical CAN segment are reported as
unknown arbitration identifiers.
Markovitz and Wool [37] presented the design and
evaluation of a novel domain-aware anomaly detection
system for intra-vehicle CAN bus network traffic. The
authors developed a classifier that is able to split the
CAN messages into fields and identify the field type
and its boundaries without any prior knowledge of
the message format. The authors observed the pres-
ence of three type of fields: Constant, Multi-value and
Counter or Sensor fields. The detection system then
builds a model for each ECU based on the charac-
teristics (i.e., field type and boundary) of the mes-
sages of the ECU obtained from the classifier. Each
field has a type, and specific properties according to
the type: the constant value for Const, the list of all
the observed values for Multi-value, and the mini-
mal and maximal observed values for Counter/Sensor.
The model is based on Ternary Content-Addressable
Memory (TCAM), which is a special type of high-
speed memory usually used by modern switches
and routers for fast look-up tables and packet
classification.
The TCAM holds a database D of patterns d1, ..., dk ,
each consists of three symbols: 0, 1 and ∗ (‘‘don’t
care"). When presented with a message m (consisting
only of 0 and 1 bits), the TCAM identifies (in parallel)
whether the database includes a matching pattern di,
(i.e., whether for every bit position j, if di[j] 6= ∗ then
di[j] = m[j]). For each ECU, the authors built a set of
TCAMs that only matches messages that fit the prop-
erties of all the ECU’s fields. Thus, any message that
does not match the TCAMs is flagged as an anomaly.
Evaluation results showed that the proposed system on
simulated CAN bus traffic can achieve a median FPR
of 1% with a median of only 89.5 TCAMs. However,
the sensitivity of the system to detect attacks was not
presented.
Dario et al. [38] proposed a novel intrusion detec-
tion algorithm for CAN bus based on computing the
Hamming distance between consecutive payloads of
different classes of ID. This is motivated by the low
computational complexity of the Hamming distance.
As such, the proposed algorithm requires small mem-
ory, which promotes its use on the ECUs of modern
vehicle. During the learning phase, the proposed algo-
rithm builds a normal range of valid hamming dis-
tances. It then analyses the sequences of payloads of all
messages transmitted via the CAN bus and compares
the Hamming distance between consecutive payloads
of the same ID with respect to the normal range of valid
Hamming distances. The proposed algorithm is evalu-
ated on traffic of a licensed unmodified vehicle. Exper-
iments’ results have shown that the proposed algorithm
is able to detect the MI attack with percentages close to
100% injection of fuzzing messages in cases of both
NoRange and SmallRange classes. However, the pro-
posed algorithm has achieved a low Detection Rate
(DR) between 20% and 30% of MidRange attacks (i.e.,
having hamming range > 6), making it unsuitable for
detecting replay attack.
(II) Computational Intelligence and Information Theory
based IDSs: Theissler [39] proposed an OCSVM-based
model that is capable of dealing with multivariate time-
series data to detect errors or faults. Experimental
results on a real dataset showed that the proposedmodel
can detect anomalies/faults with Training Time (TrT)
between 20843 and 63631 sec, Testing Time (TsT)
between 4845 and 24145 sec, False Negative (FN)
between 0.0/h and 10.5/h, True Negative (TN) between
9/h and 45/h, True Negative Rate (TNR) between
42.9% and 76.9%, and precision between 32.3% and
100%. Although the proposed model was evaluated on
a real dataset that contains errors or faults, the perfor-
mance of the proposed model on a dataset that contains
cyberattacks was not presented. In addition, in term
of computational complexity, the SVM is considered
demanding, especially when dealing with big datasets,
as it has a complexity ofO(N 3) [40]. This might hinder
the applicability of the proposed in real-world.
Narayanan et al. [41] developed a HMM to detect
anomalous states of vehicles. The authors have col-
lected data from licensed vehicles and formulated the
anomalous detection problem as classification prob-
lem. HMM was used to generate a detection model
which is then used to detect unsafe or anomalous states
from the data flowing on the CAN bus. Data captured
from the CAN bus were interpreted as a sequence of
observations (i.e., sensor reading) using sliding win-
dow approach. For example, Speed is 20 mph, RPM
is 3000, State of door is closed, etc. are modeled
as a vector sequence. The generated model predicts
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the posterior probabilities of observations of a given
sequence. If any probability of observations in the
sequence is below a threshold, based on the generated
model, it implies that getting that observation in that
sequence is very low and hence an anomalous state is
identified.
The generated model was evaluated by generat-
ing multiple anomalous scenarios. Two cases were
considered, data from a single sensor and data from
multiple sensors. Experimental results showed that the
proposed technique could be successfully used to iden-
tify anomalies and hence unsafe states in a vehicle.
However, it is not clear how the proposed technique
will workwith rare state or aperiodicmessages. In addi-
tion, it is not clear how the value of the threshold
has been specified and what is the effect of changing
the value of the threshold on the performance of the
proposed model.
Kang and Kang [42] proposed an IDS using Deep Neu-
ral Network (DNN). The detection model is trained on
high-dimensional features extracted from bit streams of
in-vehicle network packets exchanged between ECUs.
Once the features are trained and stored in the profiling
module, the proposed system examines the packets
exchanged in the vehicular network to decide whether
the system was being attacked or not. Experimental
results have shown that the proposed system could
provide a low detection latency between 7 and 8 ms
for processing 3900 packets, a high detection ratio
of 99.9%, and a low FPR of 4.3%. However, the val-
ues of the learning parameters, such as alpha and the
number of iteration, were not provided. In addition,
it was assumed that an attacker targets an instrumental
panel to deceive a driver by showing a wrong value of
the Tyre-pressure Monitor System (TPMS). However,
the attacker can target not only the instrumental panel
but also any system in the car such as ECUs and the
braking system.
Kang and Kang [43] proposed an efficient IDS for in-
vehicular network. Deep belief networks were used to
pre-train the parameters of a DNN using probability-
based feature vectors extracted from in-vehicular pack-
ets. The feature is designed with computational effi-
ciency in-mind, where it is extracted directly from
the bitstream of a CAN packet by investigating the
probability distribution of the bit-symboles of the data
field, which excludes the need for decoding during the
extraction process. Experimental results showed that
the proposed system could provide a high real-time
detection ratio of∼ 98% and FPR between 1% and 2%.
Taylor et al. [44] proposed a deep learning approach
(recurrent Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM)) for
detecting five types of attack namely interleave,
drop, discontinuity, unusual and reverse attacks. These
attacks can be considered as insertion and drop-
ping/deletion attacks. The authors deemed that the
proposed approach does not require knowledge of
the communication protocol and have the capabil-
ity of detecting novel attacks. However, the proposed
approach does not consider the inter-dependencies
between different message types as it treats each ID’s
data sequence as independent sequence. It is likely that
there are inter-dependencies between IDs as functional-
ity of an ECU depends on the data received from other
ECUs. Experimental results showed that the proposed
approach can detect certain sequences ofmessageswith
a high detection rate of 100%. However, this is not the
case for all message sequences.
Theissler [45] proposed an ensemble ML model to
detect known and unknown faults in different driving
scenarios. The proposed model consists of two-class
and one-class classifiers to detect anomalies in uni-
variate and multivariate time-series data. In general,
the two-class classifiers yield good results for known
fault types whereas the one-class classifiers perform
best for previously unseen fault types. The final pre-
diction of the ensemble model is a combination of the
individual predictions of the constituent classifiers. The
proposed model was evaluated on data from road trials
of a Renault Twingo I (model year 2002). The results
showed that it is possible to detect different types of
faults, namely erroneous injection, erroneous ignition,
unavailable engine temperature, and erroneous engine
temperature, with a high F2-score between 68.5% and
83.3%.
Ganesan and Shin [46] hypothesized that it is possible
to address compromised sensors by exploiting the nat-
ural redundancy, which occurs when a physical phe-
nomenon causes symptoms in multiple sensors, found
in vehicles. For instance, pressing the accelerator pedal
will cause the engine to pump faster and increase the
speed of the vehicle. Engine RPM and vehicle speed
are multiple sensors which respond in a related fashion
to the same cause of the accelerator pedal. The idea is
based on identifying the relationship between different
sensors under normal operation and detecting anoma-
lous behaviors accurately.
The proposed method uses pairwise correlation
between key variables and cluster-analysis to identify
distinct behavior of drivers and detect possible attacks.
For each time window, the proposed method identifies
the cluster describing the context of driving. Then,
it performs pairwise cross correlation and compares the
computed correlation values with those expected for
that cluster. For each pair, the proposed method calcu-
lates the deviation from the mean correlation value for
that cluster and reports it in terms of number of standard
deviations from the mean. It considers and reports
deviations that exceed a threshold as attacks. Although
the idea of creating driving context and exploiting
redundancy is a potential idea to detect abnormality,
however how to choose the threshold value in order
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to report possible attacks was not presented in this
work. In addition, the cause of abnormality could be
a number of situations including malicious attacks,
ECU faults or extreme driving conditions, however
how to differentiate between attacks and faults was not
discussed.
Martinelli et al. [47] considered the data field
of CAN messages as feature vector to discrimi-
nate between normal and malicious messages. The
authors used four Fuzzy algorithms, namely Fuzzy-
RoughKNN, K-nearest Neighbour (KNN), Discerni-
bilityClassifier and Fuzzy Unordered Rule Induction
Algorithm (FURIA), which have been applied to the
eight features (i.e., 8 data bytes of the data field of
CAN message). Experimental results on real-world
data demonstrated that using fuzzy classification algo-
rithms can obtain a FPR between 0 and 0.038, preci-
sion between 0.963 and 1, recall between 0.823 and
1, F-Measure between 0.981 and 1, and AUC between
0.986 and 1 in detecting three types of attack, namely
DoS, Fuzzy andMI of two types of messages, targeting
CAN protocol identification.
Haas et al. [48] gave a brief overview of IDSs and dis-
cussed some of the major cyber security threats against
connected cars. Haas et al then explained how IDSs
can be implemented using ANN. A similar approach
has been adopted in [49] where the authors proposed a
Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) -based IDS.
Wang et al. [50] proposed a distributed IDS for
modification and replay attacks based on Hierarchical
Temporal Memory (HTM) learning, which is capa-
ble of predicting data flow in real-time based on the
status of previous data sequences. The HTM net-
work continuously learns online. When the input data
stream changes, the memory of the model is updated
and the detection system will also continue to learn
new patterns in the CAN network. The proposed
method monitors all data sequence and detect anoma-
lies without a prior knowledge of underlying bus proto-
cols. Because HTM network has the capability to learn
online from streaming data, the algorithm can detect
not only the known attacks of CAN bus, but also the
unknown attacks.
The overall evaluation of the system proved that the
proposed method has a more reliable detection com-
pared with other existing CAN data domain anomaly
detection methods, such as HMM and RNN. However,
more work is needed to improve the performance of
the system in more complex situations. For instance,
removing redundant fields in the data can significantly
reduce the training time of the model, improving its
efficiency. In addition, real datasets, that have more
attacks, are needed to evaluate the performance of the
proposed system.
Loukas et al. [5] proposed a ML-based IDS for robot
vehicle. Loukas et al have shown experimentally that
RNN-based deep learning, which considers the tem-
poral elements of cyberattacks, enhanced by LSTM
can improve the intrusion detection accuracy in com-
parison with standard ML classifiers (e.g., Multi-
Layered Perceptron (MLP)). In order to address the
high time complexity of deep learning approaches,
a cloud-based computational offloading framework
was adopted. Loukas et al. discussed when offloading
is practical from the detection latency perspective. The
proposed IDS achieved a detection accuracy of 86.9%.
(III) Others/Hybrid: In a more recent work, Bezemskij
et al. [51] proposed a method based on Bayesian
network that can identify attacks and their sources
(e.g., cyber or physical domain). The Bayesian net-
work takes the output of the mechanism proposed
in [35] as an input to further identify the origin of the
attack. The Hill-Climbing algorithm was adopted to
construct a closed Direct Cyclic Graph (DAG) taking
into account all entities given to the Bayesian network.
Experimental results have shown that the proposed
method can detect cyberattacks with high accuracy
(AUC value between 0.950 and 0.995), and a lower
accuracy for normal observations (AUC value between
0.862 and 0.983) and physical attacks (AUC value
between 0.686 and 0.954).
3) OTHERS/HYBRID
Müter et al. [52] introduced a set of detection sensors: formal-
ity sensor, location sensor, range sensor, frequency sensor,
correlation sensor, protocol sensor, plausibility sensor and
consistency sensor, which allow the recognition of attacks
during the operation of vehicles without causing false pos-
itives. This is because the detection sensors are based on
unambiguous and reliable information only, which are the
network protocol specifications, the defined cooperative net-
working behavior of the devices, redundant data sources in
the vehicle, or a combination of these. Therefore, an incident
is reported only when the system is in an abnormal state.
Though these sensors can be used to detect attacks without
false positive, not all attacks are detectable by these sensors.
For example, if the attacker is able to inject messages that are
fully compliant to the network’s normal behavior and plausi-
ble to previous values. In addition, it is difficult to determine
if the abnormality is caused by an attack, error, or failure.
Zhang et al. [53] identified and discussed the unique chal-
lenges of malware detection in autonomous vehicles. The
authors presented a cloud-assisted vehicle malware protec-
tion framework.
Olga Berlin et al. [54] introduced a Security Informa-
tion and Event Management System (SIEM) called Security
Management of Services in Connected Cars (SeMaCoCa).
The proposed system uses data from vehicles (e.g., odometer
values) as well as additional information from other sources
(e.g., data from third parties and service garages) to recognise
attacks. The SeMaCoCa uses a combination of rule-based,
ML, deep learning, real-time-based, security and big data
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algorithms. Although using data from different sources might
improve the detection capability of the proposed system,
the proposed system wasn’t numerically evaluated. As it
utilises data from different sources, which are expected to
be large in size, scalability of the proposed system should
be studied as the system might not scale-up to large-scale
heterogeneous data.
Vasistha [55] proposed three techniques to detect anoma-
lies on the CAN bus. Vasistha proposed a cross-correlation
technique to validate values of multiple sensors and detect
anomalies based on the observation that sensors values are
highly correlated in normal behavior. For example, the speed
of the front right wheel is highly correlated with the speed
of the front left wheel. However, such technique requires
knowing the semantics of the protocol to decode the values of
the sensors. Vasistha also proposed a timing-based detector
to detect changes in the timing behavior of messages using
deterministic and statistical approaches. The author con-
cluded that attacks can be detected by comparing delay distri-
bution of messages with normal delay distribution behavior.
A deviation from the normal behavior is considered as an
attack. This method can detect attacks without the need to
know the semantic of the messages.
Moreover, Vasistha proposed a detection technique that
observes the order of messages from a single ECU to detect
attacks. This is based on the observation that messages from
an ECU have a specific order that always seen in. Any devia-
tion from the order can be flagged as an attack. Experiments
on Honda Civic, Toyota Camry, and KIA showed that the
proposed techniques can detect several types of attacks (such
as MI, deletion, and DoS) with a detection latency of 2 sec
and FPR between 0% and 3.5%.
Weber et al. [56] proposed a hybrid IDS that uses a
specification-based system and a ML-based system sequen-
tially. At the first stage, the specification-based system is
applied because it does not generate false positives and
has high efficiency. The specification-based system exam-
ines six specification-based sensors classes classified by
Müter et al. [52], including formality, location, range, fre-
quency, correlation, and protocol sensor. The authors did not
realise the formality and protocol sensors at this stage as
the information required to implement such type of protocol
checks is mostly available in an OEM-specific and not stan-
dardized specifications. In the second stage, ML algorithms,
Replicator Neural Network, OCSVM and Lightweight On-
line Detector for Anomalies (LODA), are trained on features
extracted from data for advanced contextual and collective
anomalies that cannot be detected by the specification-based
system such as an unnatural time series of a communication
signal (i.e., plausibility sensor). The decisions of the ML
algorithms are fused to decide if there is an intrusion or not.
In this work, the authors proposed LODA as a potential
classifier for detecting anomalies in CAN.
Zhang et al. [57] followed a similar approach to the
one proposed by Weber et al. [56]. Zhang et al proposed a
two-stage IDS based on rule-based and deep-learning-based
FIGURE 4. The Two-stage IDS proposed in [57].
systems to detect attacks in real time. The first stage is rule-
based detection whereas the second stage is a DNN-based
system. The rule-based system is used to offset the compu-
tational requirements of the deep-learning system. As in Fig-
ure 4, the lightweight rule-based system quickly detects
attacks that violate the periodicity and regularity of major
CAN traffic while the DNN-based system catches missed
attacks from the rule-based system. Performance evaluation
of the proposed system on real traces from three vehicles,
namely Honda Accord, Asia brand vehicle and US brand
vehicle, showed that the proposed system can detect five
types of attacks (MI (random ID or Zeros ID), spoofing,
replay, and deletion or drop attacks) with a DR between
99.91% and 99.97%, FPR between 0.18% and 0.090%, and
TsT between 0.53 ms and 0.61 ms per message.
B. FEATURES AND FEATURE SELECTION
Intrusion detection depends mainly on observing data
exchanged among connected entities/nodes (e.g., ECUs).
A dataset comprises a set of records/instances, which repre-
sent events, objects, or processes. Each instance is character-
ized by a set of features which describe/measure properties
of the instance. For example, a message can be considered as
a record and its time-stamp could be considered as a feature.
These features are used to build a detection model that can
distinguish between normal and intrusive behaviors or mes-
sages. In this paper, we distinguish between two types of
features: physical and cyber features. Physical features refer
to the features that describe the physical state of the system
(e.g., speed, engine RPM) whereas cyber features refer to the
features that describe the communication and data aspects of
the system (e.g., number of messages, data sequences).
As can be seen in Tables 5–7, most of the reviewed works
in this paper (e.g., [19], [23], [31], [33], [38], [42], [56])
used cyber features to characterize and detect intrusions. Out
of 42 works reviewed in this paper, only two works, [32]
and [28], have used physical features to detect attacks. Four
works [5], [18], [35], [51] have used a combination of cyber
and physical features to detect intrusions, and two works did
not provide description of the used features. Figure 5 provides
statistics of the reported features used in the reviewed works.
In theory, having more features should result in a more
discriminating power [58]. However, practically, adding irrel-
evant or redundant features to a dataset often negatively
impacts the discrimination capability of a learning algorithm
that learns from the data. Thus, selecting right features is
of critical importance since it could not only reduce the
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FIGURE 5. Statistics of Feature Sets.
computational cost but also improve the generalization capa-
bilities of the learning system and give a better understanding
of the data.
Feature selection can be done manually, based on under-
standing the problem and the importance of each feature in
discriminating between different classes in a classification
problem, such as intrusion detection. However, sometimes it
is difficult to have a deep understanding of the data and how it
can be used to solve a problem, especially when dealing with
high-dimension datasets (e.g., gene microarray [59]). In such
cases, automated methods are useful. Feature selection meth-
ods can be broadly categorized into twomain categories, filter
methods and wrapper methods.
Filter methods depend on the characteristics of the data
to select features independently of the learning algorithm.
Because of their simplicity and success in practical applica-
tions, ranking methods (e.g., Pearson correlation and mutual
information) are used as the principle criteria for variable
selection in filter methods. Each feature is given a score
based on a ranking method and a threshold is used to remove
the features with scores below the threshold [59]. However,
the selected feature set by a filter method might not be
optimal as a redundant subset might be obtained. In addi-
tion, features that are less informative in their own but more
informative when combined with other features could be
discarded [59].
Wrapper methods optimize a learning algorithm as a part
of the feature subsets evaluation and selection processes [60].
As the number of features grows, finding an optimal fea-
ture set becomes infeasible using a wrapper method since it
requires evaluating the performance of the learning algorithm
in each round. Thus, search algorithms (e.g., sequential fea-
ture selection and Genetic algorithm) are used to find a subset
of features that maximizes the performance of the learning
algorithm and is computationally feasible.
Out of all works reviewed in this paper, three
works [2], [28], and [57] have employed feature selection
methods, namely Joint Mutual Information and Sequential
Forward Selection (SFS). The SFS is a bottom-up search
procedure that starts with empty feature set and sequentially
FIGURE 6. Statistics of Data Types.
add features to the set. The SFS select features based an
evaluation function that minimizes the misclassification error
rate. A feature is selected if adding this feature to the feature
set produces a minimum classification error compared with
adding other feature.
C. DATASETS
Thorough evaluation of an IDS is of critical importance as
many approaches fail to meet what is expected from them in
real-world scenario [61]. This requires an appropriate dataset
that represents the real-world scenarios [62]. We categorize
the datasets used in the works reviewed in this paper into: real
data that are extracted from test vehicles, simulated data refer
to the data generated by simulation or prototyping, and data
that are not comprehensively described in the source work. As
can be seen in Figure 6, 21 works out of 42 works reviewed
in this, such as [18], [31], [34], [38], and [50], have used real
data, whereas 11 works, such as [5], [6], and [42], have used
simulated data, and 10 works did not provide comprehensive
description of the used data.
D. ATTACK TYPES
Autonomous vehicles are susceptible to several cyberattacks
with different severity levels ranging from eavesdropping to
threatening road users’ safety, and even paralyzing the whole
transportation system [16]. Generally speaking, cyberattacks
can be classified into two categories: passive and active
attacks. Passive cyberattacks (e.g., eavesdropping) mainly
breach the confidentiality requirement of the target system’s
security and cause privacy leakage (e.g., accessing private
data, such as position information, conversation data, and
camera records) [63], [64]. Active cyberattacks can obstruct
systems’ functionality by insertion, deletion, or modification
of messages. For instance, it is possible to control primary
functions and components (e.g., disabling the braking system
and engine) of an autonomous vehicle by compromising its
internal network [4]. In what follows, based on our review
of existing works, we discuss most common cyberattacks
against intra-vehicle networks.
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FIGURE 7. Typical Examples of Cyberattacks Against Intra-vehicle Network.
1) DENIAL OF SERVICE (DOS) ATTACK
A DoS attack aims to diminish or disturb the expected func-
tionality of the system. For example, an attacker may send
many legitimate requests beyond the ability of a target system
to handle them, draining the resources of the system and
paralyzing its functions. In vehicular ad-hoc networks for
instance, the attacker might shutdown the communication
network established by an RSU by sending many request
messages, resulting in overloading the RSU and inability of
data sharing from and to it. This may prevent sharing of
safety related messages such as road status and warning mes-
sages, leading to fatal consequences. JellyFish attack [65],
intelligent cheater attack [66], flooding attack, and jamming
attack [67] are well-known types of DoS attack observed in
vehicular ad-hoc networks. In CAN, an attacker might exploit
the arbitration mechanism of CAN protocol to hinder the
transmission of legitimate messages by sending high priority
messages, forcing other ECUs to stop their transmission [8].
It is worth mentioning that an attacker with limited knowl-
edge can launch DoS, thus the likelihood and impact of such
attack is considered very high [14].
2) MESSAGE INJECTION (MI) AND REPLAY ATTACK
In MI attack, the attacker sends a valid message over the
network. As in Figure 7, the attacker gains an access to
ECU (D) and controls it. The attacker then injects fabricated
messages to the CAN bus as shown in the timeline. In a replay
attack, an attacker stores a valid message at a certain time and
uses it at later stages [68]. For example, the attacker can store
the speedometer reading and broadcast it again to the network
later on.
3) MESSAGE MANIPULATION
This attack impacts the integrity of the data by alter-
ing/modifying or deleting messages. For instance, an attacker
can modify the content of a message. As in Figure 7,
the attacker manages to compromise the Gateway, which con-
nects two CAN buses, and intentionally modifies a message
originated from ECU (D) and intended to ECU (C). The
attacker might modify the content of the message without
affecting its timing. Note that field modification and deletion
attacks are subtypes of message manipulation attack. In a
deletion attack, the attacker deletes messages in the output
buffer of the compromised ECU before transmitting them on
the CAN bus.
4) MASQUERADE ATTACK
To mount a masquerade attack, also known as imperson-
ation attack, the attacker needs to compromise two ECUs
(A and B). The attacker monitors the CAN bus to learn
which messages are sent by A? and at what frequency?.
Once the attacker learned the IDs and the frequency of the
messages sent by A, the attacker stops the transmissions of A
and exploits B to fabricate and inject messages on behalf of
A [25].
5) MALWARE ATTACK
Malware may exist in various forms such as viruses, worms,
and spyware, which can be injected into the system by
exploiting vulnerabilities of the communication interfaces.
For example, an attacker can exploit the input vulnerabilities
of the media player firmware of a vehicle to add a malware to
music files. The malware runs and sends malicious messages
into the CAN of the vehicle when the infotainment system
plays these music files [69].
As can be seen in Figure 8, 69% of the reviewed works
considered MI and replay attacks whereas 26%, 17%, 10%,
and 7% of the works focused on detecting message manipu-
lation, DoS, malware, and masquerade attack, respectively.
About 29% of the reviewed works focused on other types
of attacks, such as reversing of messages order, or did not
consider specific types of attack.
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FIGURE 8. Statistics of Attack Types.
TABLE 3. Confusion matrix of a classifier on a two-class problem.
E. EVALUATION METRICS
Several performance metrics are used to evaluate the perfor-
mance of proposed methods. In the following, we discuss
most commonly used performance metrics to evaluate the
performance of IDSs in intra-vehicle networks.
1) ConfusionMatrix (CM):ACM is a table that represents
the performance of a classifier. Table 3 represents the
CM of a binary classifier in a two-class classification
problem. True Positive (TP) is the number of correctly
classified intrusions, True Negative (TN) is the number
of correctly classified normal records, False Negative
(FN) is the number of incorrectly classified intrusions
as normal traffic, and False Positive (FP) is the number
of incorrectly classified normal traffic as intrusions.
A good classifier has high TP and TN, and low FP and
FN
2) Detection Accuracy (Acc): Acc reveals a classifier’s
ability to correctly classify normal and intrusive traffic.
Acc is given by [62] :
Acc = TP+ TN
TP+ TN + FP+ FN . (1)
However, Acc, as a single evaluation metric, might
be misleading when dealing with imbalanced/skewed
data. For example, a classifier that always predicts the
class label of a test record as negative achieves an
Acc of 95% on a dataset of 95 negative records and
5 positive records. As such, having a high Acc does
not necessarily mean that the classifier performs well
in detecting all class types.
3) Detection Rate (DR): DR, which also known as
recall or True Positive Rate (TPR), is the number of
intrusions/attacks detected by the model divided by the
total number of attacks in the test set. A DR value of 1
means that the detection model correctly detects all
intrusions whereas a DR value of 0 means the detection
model fails in detecting all intrusions. DR is given
by [62]:
DR = TP
TP+ FN . (2)
4) False Positive Rate (FPR): FPR refers to the percentage
of normal traffic classified as intrusion. FPR is given
by:
FPR = FP
TN + FP . (3)
5) False Negative Rate (FNR): FNR refers to the percent-
age of attack traffic classified as normal. FNR is given
by:
FNR = FN
TP+ FN . (4)
6) F-measure: The F-measure of a classifier is the
harmonic average of the precision and recall (i.e.,
DR or TPR) of the classifier. The precision is the num-
ber of correct positive results divided by all positive
results returned by the classifier. Precision and recall
are given by:
Precision = TP
TP+ FP , (5)
Recall = 1− FNR. (6)
The value of the F-measure is between 0 and 1, where
value of 1 represents a good classifier and value of 0
represents a bad classifier. The F-measure is given by:
F − measure = 2× TP
2× TP+ FP+ FN . (7)
Although the F-measure is advocated as a single metric
to capture the effectiveness of a classifier, it still ignores
the TN which can vary freely without affecting the
statistics [70].
7) Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve and
AUC: A ROC curve is a visualization of the perfor-
mance of a classifier. A ROC curve can be drawn by
plotting the FPR vs TPR of a classifier, as in Figure 9.
A perfect classifier will score in the top left corner of
a ROC curve. A random classifier would be expected
to score along the diagonal line of the ROC curve. The
AUC quantifies the performance of a classifier where a
value of 1 represents a perfect classifier and a value near
0.5 indicates random detection. ROC curve and AUC
are suitable metric for model selection and comparison
especially when dealing with skewed data.
In addition to the above metrics, some works use other
metrics to evaluate the performance of proposed methods.
For example, [19] and [31] used throughput to evaluate the
performance of the proposed models. TrT and TsT have been
used in [42] to evaluate the performance of the proposed
method. The TrT is the time required to build the detection
model whereas TsT represents the time required to classify
new messages. The TsT implies the throughput of the sys-
tem where a low TsT means a high throughput. Throughput
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FIGURE 9. Typical ROC graph.
and power consumptions were used in [19] to evaluate the
performance of the proposed model. Monther Aldwairi and
Jarrah [17] used the execution time, which is the time from
reading the pattern until the end of matching process of a
knowledge-based IDS, speedup, and memory usage to evalu-
ate the performance of the proposed model.
F. BENCHMARK MODELS
It can be observed from Tables 5–7 that minority of existing
works provide a comparison of the proposed methods with
the existing ones. However, someML-based detectionmodels
have been used for comparison purposes, including Decision
Tree (DT), ANNs and deep learning, SVM and OCSVM, and
Random Forest (RF).
• A DT is a graphical representation of possible deci-
sions through a sequence of certain conditions or tests.
It consists of nodes, edges, and branches. Nodes are
arranged in a tree hierarchy and represent a test on an
attribute/feature, based onwhich the data are partitioned,
each branch represents the outcome of the test and each
leaf node represents a class label or decision. Each node
has a number of edges, which are labeled according
to the possible value of the test and connect between
nodes. A root node represents the topmost node and
has no incoming edges [62]. Decision trees take labeled
training data, which might contain numerical or categor-
ical values, as an input and construct decision models
that can be used to predict the class type of a new
instance or message [71]. The classification process of a
test instance starts from the root node to the appropriate
leaf node, and the path from the root node to the leaf
node represents the classification rule [71].
• ANNs are data processing units inspired by human
brain neurons. An ANN consists of multiple layers of
simple processing units called nodes or neurons. Each
node or neuron is connected with other nodes by a
weighted connection that specifies cross-nodes effects.
Such networks are able to compute values by feeding
data from the input layer till the output layer. ANNs
learn through adjusting the weights of the connections
between the processing nodes to achieve the desired
results [72]. Feed-forward and back-propagation learn-
ing are well-known learning methods of ANNs; how-
ever, back-propagation performs superbly at classifica-
tion and prediction tasks in the literature. In addition
to its ability to learn and generalize from noisy and
incomplete data [73], ANN can be used tomap nonlinear
statistical relationship of high-dimensional data to two-
dimensional, thus, it can extract relationships among
complex datasets [74]. The performance of ANN is
affected by the number of neurons in use. The higher
the number of neurons, the better the performance. How-
ever, increasing the number of neurons results in a dra-
matic increase in the computational cost [75]. Recently,
ANNs and deep learning approaches, which incorporate
several layers, have proven distinguished performance
in several applications including IDS for intra-vehicle
networks. Generally speaking, deep learning approaches
require large-scale data to learn from.
• Originally, SVMdeals with two-class problems in which
data are separated into two classes; however, it can
be extended to multiple-class applications. SVM builds
hyper-plans that separate different classes. SVM tries
to set a linear boundary between different classes in
such a way that the margin area is maximized. Data-
points/instances that define the margins are called sup-
port vectors and are used to define classifiers indepen-
dently of the input features. This property gives SVM
the advantage that it can generalize well [76]. SVM uses
kernel functions to transform nonlinear SVM into linear
SVM by mapping the original feature or attribute space
into higher dimensional space in which data are linearly
separable. Hence, SVM can find linear, nonlinear, and
complex decision boundaries accurately [77]. However,
parameter selection of SVM is not easy and still follows
a trial-and-error approach. Moreover, the running time
of SVM quadruples when the size of the training data
is doubled, which demotivates its use when dealing with
large-scale data [77]. Several works proposed OCSVM-
based IDSs, such as [2] and [22]. OCSVM learns deci-
sion boundaries of one-class training dataset, typically
normal or attack-free data, and detects anomalies based
on the learned decision boundaries.
• A RF is an ensemble classifier that consists of a collec-
tion of base classifiers typically random decision trees.
In order to reduce the variance error, base classifiers
are required to differ in the error that they commit on
testing instances. This is provided by building the base
classifiers on non-identical training datasets. Typically,
bootstrap resampling is used to generate training data for
each tree in the ensemble model, and also a randomly
selected subset of input features is used to find the best
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TABLE 4. General Summary of Intra-vehicle Intrusion Detection
Techniques.
FIGURE 10. Statistics of Detection Technique.
splitter at each node of the DTs [78]. To classify a new
input instance, feed the input instance down each of the
DTs in the ensemble model and the final decision is
the majority vote among all individual decisions in the
ensemble [60].
IV. RESEARCH GAPS AND CHALLENGES
In this section, we discuss research challenges and iden-
tify research gaps, supported by the trends observed
in Tables 5–7.
A. DETECTION TECHNIQUES AND DESIGN
Figure 10 shows that 14%, 21%, and 43% of the reviewed
works utilized rule-based, time and frequency analysis, and
CI&IT techniques, respectively, to detect intrusions in intra-
vehicle networks, and the remaining works adopted hybrid
approaches of the former techniques.
Rule-based techniques need prior knowledge such as
underlying distribution of data, the known models regarding
a system, and empirical assumptions [1]. Since they perform
rule matching to detect intrusions, rule-based IDSs are fast
and computationally cheap when small rule set is used. How-
ever, the matching process might become a burden in terms
of memory and computation when a large number of rules
is used. In addition, such techniques may fail short of what
expected from them when applied to application scenarios
that do not fit their prior knowledge. Time and frequency
analysis based IDSs also require some prior knowledge that
is normally learned by observing data flow under normal
vehicle operation. On the other hand, computational intel-
ligence based techniques don’t need any prior knowledge
as they set no assumptions on the underlying distribution
of the data. This type of IDS learns the normal network
profile from multivariate training data using a learning pro-
cedure. Among other detection techniques, this technique
has the strongest capability for generalization. However, for
some such systems it is hard to understand what happens
inside the system. For example, it is difficult to explain
what is happening inside a large ANN and to understand
the meaning of the values of the weights. Additionally, most
of them are resource intensive in terms of computation and
memory [56].
Having considered the shortcomings and merits of existing
techniques, it is possible to hypothesize that no single tech-
nique can satisfy all the requirements of intra-vehicle IDSs,
such as high generality and throughput, and low false positive
rate. Accordingly, the intra-vehicle IDSs should be designed
while bearing in mind the requirements of modern vehicles.
For instance, safety related applications are time stringent
applications that require packet delivery in less than 100 ms.
In this case, an intra-vehicle IDS should have a high through-
put in order to fill this requirement. As such, rule-based
techniques is a potential candidate. However, their limited
generality demotivate their use as novel cyberattacks might
emerge with time, for example bus-off attack which wasn’t
known until recently [2]. The primary question here which
detection technique turn out to be the suitable technique for
detecting intra-vehicle intrusions. In addition, the placement
of the IDS is an important issue that fairly discussed in the
literature. For example, placing the IDS at a gateway will
allow observing data from different networks, based onwhich
it is possible to find correlation among data pieces, leading
to identify intrusions. This will not be possible if the IDS is
placed on an ECU within a network with no access to data
in other networks. Thus, the design of intra-vehicle networks
should consider the selection of suitable detection technique
as well as the placement of the IDS.
B. FEATURES AND FEATURE SELECTION
As can be seen in Figure 5, most of reviewed works detect
intrusions by examining cyber features only. However, it has
been shown that incorporating physical features in the detec-
tion process can result in improved performance, see [5], [18],
[35], and [51]. Conceptually, a cyberattack might, and indeed
is likely to, compromise some data sources of the vehicle
while leaving others unaffected. As such, data fusion of
multiple sources is required to effectively detect attacks and
malfunctioning sensors. However, most of works reviewed in
this paper do not analyze multiple data sources, especially
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across the cyber and physical features, in detecting attacks.
Unlike IDS research for computer networks, there is no
specific well-defined feature set used in intra-vehicle IDS
research. In addition, as mentioned in the previous section,
having more features is likely to improve the detection per-
formance of a learning algorithm. However, it should be
recognized that noisy features may negatively impact the
performance of the learning algorithm as well as increas-
ing computation time. Therefore, selecting the right fea-
tures can improve the detection performance and reduce the
required computation and resources. Therefore, a potential
research direction is defining and selecting discriminating
features for intrusion detection applications in intra-vehicle
networks.
C. ATTACK TYPES AND REACTIVE MEASURES
Figure 8 shows that most existing works propose algorithms
designed to target specific types of attack (i.e., MI). How-
ever, novel attacks are likely to emerge over the life-time
of the vehicle. For example bus-off attacks were not known
until recently [2]. A potential research area is to investi-
gate and study protocols vulnerabilities in order to define
potential unknown attacks. Once all possible attacks are
defined, an intrusion detection model can be designed to fill
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the detection and performance requirements of automotive
networks.
Once an attack is perceived to have been detected, the sys-
tem must decide what action to take. Traditionally in com-
puter networks, the IDS raises an alert to the user reporting
the incident and asking for user input on what action to take.
However, such an action could cause a distraction if the alert
is made to driver and could lead to traffic accident. Moreover,
the driver is unlikely to have the technical knowledge to
advise on the most appropriate action and, in any case, likely
21284 VOLUME 7, 2019
O. Y. Al-Jarrah et al.: IDSs for Intra-Vehicle Networks: Review
TABLE 7. Summary of Others/Hybrid Approaches.
to require significant time to make a decision, thereby failing
to prevent the attack being realized successfully [52]. Study-
ing and designing appropriate alerting methods in the case




Evaluation benchmark datasets are essential to evaluate and
compare the performance of IDSs. For many years, the pub-
licly available DARPA/Lincoln packet traces [79], [80] and
KDDCup [81] datasets have been used as benchmark datasets
to evaluate the performance of IDSs in conventional com-
puter networks. Although they have been criticized due to
their lack of recent and modern normal traffic and attack
styles, these datasets have served as de-facto for evaluating
IDSs in conventional computer networks. Having benchmark
datasets enables researchers to replicate experiments and ver-
ify results. Although most of the work reviewed in this paper
use simulated or real-time data from test vehicles, there is a
shortage of public benchmark dataset comprising real data
for intra-vehicle IDS research. As such a potential research
direction is generating benchmark datasets for IDS in intra-
vehicle networks.
2) PERFORMANCE METRICS
Most of works reviewed in this paper use Acc, DR, and FPR
to evaluate the performance of a proposed IDS. However,
detection latency, which is sometimes referred to as through-
put, and training time are critical metrics that researchers
seldom report. While it is important to detect attacks with
a high accuracy, detection latency is also important. For
example, while it is desirable to have an accuracy of 99%,
if detecting an attack takes an hour, the attacker may still
be able to cause significant harm to the system. It is also
desirable that the IDS be efficient and not be a bottleneck
of the network. It is critical to have a high throughput so
that the IDS does not inhibit data communication. This is
of a paramount importance as some applications are time
stringent applications (e.g., safety applications which require
delays of less than 100 ms). Researchers should, therefore,
consider time complexity as a key metric to evaluate the
performance of an IDS or even develop a new evaluation
metric that takes into account the complexity of the system.
3) BENCHMARK MODELS
It can be observed in Tables 5–7 that there is no standard
benchmark detection model to compare the performance of
proposed detection models with it. This might result in dis-
crepancies in the results reported in different work as there is
no baseline to which to refer to. For instance, in conventional
computer networks IDS research, Snort is considered as a
standard rule set to be compared to. SVM, DT, and ANN are
well-known models that are commonly used to compare the
performance of newly proposed ML-based IDSs. However,




As discussed in Section III, existing works examine the
validity of data against some rules (e.g., data range), data
sequences, features and content to detect intrusions. Different
approaches, such as ML and expert knowledge, have been
used to build the detection model and capture the correla-
tion among data pieces. However, these approaches haven’t
considered the semantics of the data. Attackers who exploit
the semantics of messages can remain undetected since the
current value of a physical variable depends on many fac-
tors, including context and semantics [32]. For example, it is
normal to have a value 120 Km/h for the speedometer of the
vehicle. However, it is not normal to have the same speedwith
an rpm value of 1. Developing a context-aware IDS requires
processing of data multi-sources in order to build a global
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normal-behavior profile of the vehicle. Currently, this area
is still under-investigated, with the exception being the work
presented in [32].
2) ML ALGORITHMS
In recent years, ML algorithms (e.g., deep learning) have
attracted a tremendous attention from academia as well as
industry as they have been seen to have distinguished perfor-
mance in several fields, such as computer vision, autonomous
driving, pattern recognition, natural language processing,
as well as intrusion detection.
ML algorithms can be broadly categorized into super-
vised, unsupervised, and semi-supervised learning algo-
rithms. Supervised learning algorithms, such as ANN and
SVM, deal with data that have explicit outputs of given inputs.
These construct a model based on the training data. Then,
this model can be used to label new instances or records that
have never previously been seen by the model. When the
audit data do not include any sort of outputs, this is known as
unsupervised learning and an example of this type of method
is a clustering algorithms; unsupervised learning refers to
finding structures and patterns in the data. Unlike supervised
and unsupervised learning, semi-supervised learning algo-
rithms, such as self-learning and co-training techniques, rely
on audit data of labeled and unlabeled instances or records.
The labeled instances are used to build a target function that is
used to classify the unlabeled instances, in order to generate
more labeled data, and then to build a model based on the new
audit data.
Several works have used ML algorithms, such as [5], [18],
[42], [43], and [50]. Most of these works use supervised ML
algorithms to build their detection models. However, labeled
data are not always available since it requires domain knowl-
edge and has a high cost to produce. Although unsupervised
and semi-supervise ML algorithms have been used to build
intrusion detection models in conventional networks, there
is a limited use of them in intra-vehicle IDSs. Furthermore,
the use of online learning, which allows learning from stream-
ing data, in intra-vehicle remains relatively unexplored.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Modern vehicles are vulnerable to a wide range of security
threats that can be exploited by attackers to gain access to the
vehicles and eventually control them. Although conventional
security mechanisms can protect targeted systems from exter-
nal attacks, they are not usually applicable to intra-vehicle
networks. Given this, IDSs represent an essential component
of vehicles security suit.
This paper provided an overview of intra-vehicle networks
and examined contemporary research in intra-vehicle net-
works IDSs in an effort to identify research challenges and
gaps. The research developments have been examined against
six criteria, namely detection technique, features and feature
selection methods, data, attack type, performance metrics,
and benchmark models. A summary of works examined in
this paper was presented in Tables 5–7. The reviewed works
have been classified into twomain categories: flow-based and
payload-based IDSs. Flow-based IDSs are sensitive to timing
and frequency change of messages. However, they fall short
when confronted with attacks that only change the message
content. On the other hand, payload-based IDSs can detect
attacks that change the content of messages. However, such
systems are blind to attacks that change message timing and
frequency. The reviewed works were further sub-classified
into seven subcategories based on their detection technique.
Based on observations and analysis from Tables 5–7, six
potential research areas have been identified. Firstly, no sin-
gle solution can provide a full detection capability of intra-
vehicle attacks since each detection technique has its own
shortcomings and merits, and thus the design process of
IDS for intra-vehicle should consider the requirements of the
system and have the ability to generalize to unknown attacks.
Secondly, most existing works rely solely on cyber features to
identify intrusions. However, as vehicles are cyber-physical
systems, it is more appropriate to also examine the physical
features of the vehicle during the detection process. While
including more features is important, it is necessary to select
the most discriminative features since this can significantly
improve the performance of the detection model and reduce
its complexity. Thirdly, there is a dearth of work trying to
identify all possible attacks against intra-vehicle networks.
In addition, our study has also shown that no work as yet
has studied how the system should respond to intrusions. This
is of critical importance as inappropriate actions can lead to
safety issues. Fourthly, there is a lack of benchmark datasets
for intra-vehicle IDS research. As well as the absences of
datasets, performance measures, such as detection and train-
ing time, are rarely reported in existing work. There is also no
benchmark detection model with which to compare the per-
formance of different detection models. This makes the use of
proposed model contentious. Collectively this demonstrates
an urgent need to generate benchmark dataset, developing
a single representative performance metric, and selecting a
benchmarkmodel for evaluating the performance of proposed
detection models. This work has also shown that most of
existing research examines cyber features to detect intru-
sions and fails to recognize the context of the data. Real-
ization of the semantics of the data is likely to improve the
performance of a detection model. Finally, ML-based IDSs
seem to be promising candidates for detecting intrusion in
intra-vehicle, due to their generalization capability. However,
the use of unsupervised, semi-supervised and online learning
techniques for intrusion detection in intra-vehicle networks
have not adequately investigated and require further study.
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